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1. Introduction 
 
There is no doubt that even a cursory examination of the indisputable efforts for 
decentralisation in Greece, will reveal that the main problem lies within the ever-expanding 
bureaucratic labyrinth of its political decision making processes and the underlying political 
and administrative system that generates and supports them. In sort, this political system, 
seems to strive for inclusiveness and broad acceptance, rather than theoretical consistency 
or elegance, setting the government incapable to play a truly co-ordinating role and exhibit 
the administrative wisdom that it implies (Ashford 1983). Seeking in this respect, to 
accommodate new demands as they emerge by means, insofar as possible, that leave 
previous arrangements (programmes and administrative regulations) undisturbed, which in 
turn involve the least possible disruption for public enterprises, as well as the least possible 
inconvenience and annoyance for institutions and individuals alike, who have built their 
life-styles around the expectation of system stability. 
However, in terms of its administrative system, Greece has the same characteristics and 
problems with most of the Mediterranean European Countries. Consequently, the potential 
of future decentralisation policies in a regional level, as they are expressed by either the 
elimination of regional disparities or the formulation of regional restructuring strategies, 
should be seen with respect to the extended  political  framework  within   which   they have 
to   be implemented. Namely, the Mediterranean frontier. 
Within this framework, this paper reviews the historical course and critically presents 
the results of the proclaimed decentralization efforts in Greece. Specifically, certain 
political and socio-economic indicators are utilised, in order both to micro-evaluate the 
regional disparities within the country and to generate a parallel macro-comparison with the 
other Mediterranean Member States of the European Union. 
 
2. The Mandates of History 
 
Since  the  re-establishment  of Greece  as   a  modern  nation, decentralisation of the 
system of government expressed through the elimination of regional and prefectural 
(provincial) inequalities, has been regularly preached by the government, asked for by the 
opposition party and recommended by many people with varying objectives   and   political   
philosophies.   Since   the   fall   of   the dictatorship in 1974 and in particular since the 
entrance of Greece to the European Union (EU) in 1981, which as with other member states 
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has been urging the government to reduce regional disparities within the country, Greece 
has not gone a single year without the government attempting to reform the system and the 
opposition criticising it, the main argument being the overwhelming role of Athens. Inside 
the community very few countries, with the exception of the neighbouring Mediterranean 
France and possibly Italy, have experienced so much reform associated with  so little 
change. Consequently and despite the regularity and persistence of this concern and the 
popularity of the issue, decentralisation still remains invisible. 
On the other hand, there is no doubt that the observed increase of administrative 
centralisation in Greece, should in many respects be granted to the insistence of the central 
government to determine the conditions within which lower levels of government of both 
the public and private sectors of the economy have to operate. In this framework, we 
believe that the following historical review of the five major time periods that distinguish 
the efforts for decentralisation reforms in Greece (Tritsis et al. 1984), might be both 
enlightening and convincing. 
2.1. First Period: 1821 -1832 
Immediately after the liberation of the country from the Ottoman empire there was no 
time, energy or experience to create a new government organisation. With the formation 
and imposition of a national government, the power and authority of the central and the 
local governments were not complementary, but rather competing. 
On the one hand the central government was operating in a very centralised fashion, while 
the local governments, remnants of the Turkish occupation, were possessing real power and 
acted accordingly. 
2.2. Second Period: 1833 -1887 
By a royal degree (3 April 1833) the country, following the French example, was 
divided into prefectures and provinces, theoretically creating administrative units with 
decentralized authority. The practice of the central government, however, as exemplified by 
a later degree (20/6/1836), clearly reflected the autocratic and highly centralised regime of 
the Bavarian King, which unfortunately lasted too long. 
2.3. Third Period: 1888 -1969 
The prefecture system which initiated in 1833 and refined in 1845 (Law KE), was 
finally put into effect, but only in the form of a simple truncated administrative 
regionalisation, where the prefecture and its administrator, as part of the ministry and under 
the minister of Interior, possessed no real administrative or for that matter any other 
authority. 
2.4. Fourth Period: 1970 -1982 
In 1970 (Presidential decree 532/1970) the prefecture finally attains full administrative 
independence and the administrator becomes the real supervisor of its bureaucratic 
apparatus. But decentralisation stops short of providing real power for political, economic 
and other important functions of the area, which remain in the hands of the central 
government, who firmly exercises them. 
2.5. Fifth Period: 1983 - Present 
A new approach was formulated by the socialist government, which firstly established 
in 1983 a four tier structure (Nation, Region, Prefecture, Local authorities) and secondly in 
1994, by initiating for the first time simultaneous elections at the local and prefectural level. 
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However, the division of power remains to be effected and the appropriate decision-making 
mechanisms by which an operating and truly decentralised administration system will be 
accomplished have yet to be specified. As a concept, it is indeed a far cry improvement over 
the existing situation, but as decentralisation reform is still very far from completion. 
Simply put, the socialists following all the previous governments, have paid lip service to 
the idea of a true decentralised system, while continued to govern in a very centralised way. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that throughout the modern history of Greece all efforts 
towards a decentralised system suffer from two major drawbacks: First, there was never a 
complete spherical concept upon which to base any of the innovations, especially with 
regards to the limits of power-sharing between central and local governments and second, 
all measures and policies up to now are characterised by spasmodic conception as well as 
implementation. 
 
3. Characteristics of the Government System 
 
The Greek society, influenced by the historical evolution just described, affected from 
its own peculiarities and conditions and determined by a highly complex decision making 
process, confronts a government system that is characterised by the following (Katochianou 
1985). 
3.1. Centralised System 
The Greek system is a highly centralised and strictly hierarchical system, where all 
initiatives are coming from the top, which is fully occupied by the central government. At 
the base of the system, the local authorities have only a secondary role, namely to do the 
things that the central government refuses to do, but insists on determining how to be done. 
Guidance is also a function of the centre towards the middle level of the organisational 
pyramid, the prefecture, whose administrator acts simply as agent of the central 
government. Thus, it is of no surprise that 93% of the budget is controlled by the various 
ministries in Athens, who are employing the same number of employees as all of the 6.039 
communities (cities, towns and villages) of the country. 
3.2. Ill-Structured System 
The organisational structure of the Greek system differs significantly from what 
someone might expect from a really decentralised system. In fact, the structural view of a 
decentralized system should reflect the interplay of two factors, namely autonomy and 
administrative hierarchy. That is, every echelon of authority should possess the independent 
presence of the following necessary functions (Koutsopoulos 1989): 
— political: giving them the ability to make the appropriate and relevant decisions; 
— administrative: permitting them to govern independently; 
— economic: providing them with the funds and the independence to spend them; 
— infrastructure: allowing them the self-reliance to carry out all of the previous functions. 
Moreover, within a clearly defined hierarchy, the provision of services and the 
dispensation of each function is exhausted, to the possible degree, at the lower level, so that 
the hierarchy is determined from the bottom up and autonomy is achieved. 
Unfortunately, the organisational structure of the Greek system, displays none of the 
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above characteristics, for as we have mentioned the hierarchy is determined from the top, 
while the lower decision making tiers only possess limited political, independent but not 
sufficient administrative and inadequate economic functions as well as absolutely 
insufficient infrastructure (Ministry of Internal Affairs1985). 
3.3. Pseudo-Decentralised Administration 
The result of all the unending system reforms, is that a pseudo- decentralised 
administrative structure (regional and local authorities exist, but do not have any power or 
autonomy) has been created that mainly masks some of the deficiencies of centralisation 
and provides needed excuses to the politicians for their failure to provide a truly 
decentralised system, where political, economic and administrative functions can be 
exercised by the prefectural and local authorities. 
3.4. Unadjusted Lower Levels 
Greece, by contrast to northern European countries, has not been able to adjust the 
lower levels of the system (prefectures and communities) that are ill-adapted to the present 
day requirements of urban and regional development. The Greek prefecture map has not 
been altered for the last 120 years. Thus, the prefecture of Attiki which approximately has 
40% of the Greek population and is allocated 30% of the total amount spend by all 
prefectures, has the same status than Euritania with less than 0.4% of the population and 
0.3% of the allocated funds. Moreover, the local political administrative system seems 
fossilised in the form it had in the pre-World War I period, despite the urgency of reforms 
and despite the fact that decentralisation, a policy option of all Greek parties when in 
opposition, was always forgotten on coming to power. 
Summarising, the Greek government system is epitomised by a strong central 
government, controlling and dominating all regional and local affairs (political, economic 
and administrative) and depriving subordinate political units of any influence over fiscal, 
social or any other policies affecting their areas. 
 
4. Decentralisation Aspects 
 
The political system of Greece is something a paradox. On the one hand, its task is to 
manage an extraordinary dynamic society, which throws up a constant stream of new 
demands and opportunities. On the other hand, the organisations of the political system 
itself, such as the governmental bureaucracy, are such as to generate an extreme orientation 
toward caution. Another way to put this, is to say that the political system in Greece strives 
to maintain the security of its key institutions and personnel as it responds to outside 
stimuli. Changes in the system applied by the various political parties in power, vary widely 
in the strategies that they utilise to pursue such security, and in the priority that they accord 
it, relative to other key objectives. The result, and the main objectives, however, remain the 
same and unchanged through time. 
Moreover, the system is characterised by fragmented authority and minimal ideological 
coherence. It affords numerous opportunities for veto and/or delay during the life of any 
programme and subsequently during the implementation of any policy. In such a system, 
therefore, a great many people must agree before any policy initiative can be adopted and 
effectively implemented. Thus, political timidity is the individual norm and weak leadership 
is the institutional norm. 
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4.1. The Decision-Making Process 
As a result, in Greece and with respect to decentralisation, the political system strives 
to accommodate new political demands with minimal disturbance to existing policies, 
institutional arrangements and individual behaviour patterns. At the same time, it is 
accustomed to dealing with rapidly evolving conditions and voter priorities. In short, it has 
certain political maintenance requirements of a conservative nature, but it is oriented as well 
toward dealing with the radical nature of modern reality. These characteristics result in 
piecemeal, but constant and relatively adaptive policy accretion. If they impair the clarity 
and consistency of policy outcomes, they tend also to maximise their broad acceptability. 
Additionally, they render the system unusually open to innovative ideas that can be injected 
into the ongoing stream of activities without substantially disrupting entrenched public 
programmes, private economic interests and personal life-styles. In short, the system does 
not treat apparent tensions among policy objectives as inescapable sources of conflict; 
rather it seeks by political means to blur the tensions and by technical means to find 
ingenious new means of reconciling the objectives. 
It follows therefore, that other things being equal, change strategies and policies for 
decentralisation will vary in political acceptability in accord with the degree to which they 
inconvenience institutions and powerful politicians-administrators. To this basic proposition 
we would add as a corollary, that the connection between decentralisation and regional 
disparities is a key desideratum. It matters a great deal to elected officials to be seen as 
champions in eradicating regional disparities (a very popular issue), rather than reforming 
the government (which they avoid), in the same way that powerful institution and 
individuals preach balanced development, but profit from regional disparities. Yet regional 
disparities in Greece, with its own peculiarities and conditions, reflect nothing less than the 
degree of centralisation of the government system. Implying in this respect, that in Greece a 
balanced development can in no way be achieved outside and without the assistance and 
support of a truly decentralised system. 
Given, therefore, that the problem of regional disparities has been paid lip service by 
the decision makers, the fact that decentralization improvements (the other side of the same 
coin) have not been forthcoming, can be of no surprise to anyone. As a result, as long as 
regional disparities persist, a truly decentralised system cannot be achieved. It is in this line 
of reasoning that the existence of administrative centralisation in Greece represented by the 
existence of regional and prefectural inequalities, can be easily illuminated with the 
empirical evidence presented below. 
4.2. A Tale of One Centre 
Indeed, it is a well known fact that historically uneven patterns of development have 
resulted from widely different endowments in infrastructure and in human capital, which 
are vital prerequisites for efficient decentralisation. Furthermore, there is no doubt that most 
of the affecting handicaps can be alleviated through new investment both in monetary and 
manpower terms. In such a framework, human capital, infrastructure and service provision 
levels, which are identified as the main elements underlying decentralisation, as well as 
regional disparities and policies are examined. More specifically, Gross Regional Product 
(level of economic activity), Labour Force (human endowment), Public Investment 
(government's formal intervention) and the Number of Civil Servants that will be hired this 
year differentiated into the three educational levels (non-formal intervention) are evaluated, 
for in the case of Greece they best represent the disparities between its thirteen regions 
(Table 1). 
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Table 1. Regional indicators in Greece 
 Recruitments    
Region 
 
Elementary 
Education 
High School
Education
University
Education
Total GRP Labour 
Force 
Public 
investment
 % % % % % %  % 
A.Makedonia-Thraki 4,60 4,39 4,06 4,39 4,94 6,39 5,79
Kentriki Makedonia 8,78 14,71 17,47 12,78 16,75 16,93 11,28
Dytiki Makedonia 2,83 1,94 2,71 2,57 3,31 2,62 5,08
Thessalia 2,20 2,71 4,85 3,09 6,67 6,79 6,81.
Ipeiros 2,48 3,35 3,16 2,90 2,58 2,98 5,38
Ionia Nisia 2,55 1,81 2,37 2,31 1,70 2,06 1,89
Dytiki Ellada 3,26 4,26 3,83 3,68 5,72 7,02 5,35
Sterea Ellada 3,12 2,84 5,86 3,84 6,96 5,03 6,52
Peloponnisos 1,63 2,84 4,28 2,70 5,55 6,53 11,50
Attiki 59,63 55,61 37,88 52,34 36,37 34,92 27,64
Voreio Aigaio 2,12 1,03 3,95 2,37 1,40 1,64 1,35
Notio Aigaio 4,25 2,58 2,93 3,45 2,93 2,04 3,75
Kriti 2,55 1,94 6,65 3,58 5,12 5,05 6,67
 
The figures in table 1, which are all expressed as the percentage of each region to the 
total, point out some persistent differentiations. First, there is a significant gap between the 
prefecture of Attiki and secondary the urbanised prefectures (Attiki, Kentriki Makedonia 
and Dytiki Ellada) and the rest of the country, underlining the dominant role of Athens and 
the next two biggest cities of Thessaloniki and Patra. Second, the distribution of every 
prefecture in each factor (along each column), practically follows the population 
distribution (Table 2). Any deviation from the expected (due to their population) value 
simply reflects idiomatic regional circumstances (different capacities to adapt to the trends 
and calls of the last decades). Third, there are significant fluctuations in the distribution of 
every factor for each prefecture (along each row). Especially revealing are the differences 
between the percentages of the civil servants' recruitment and public investments rates, 
which reflect the actual and the government's perceived spatial needs and priorities 
respectively. More specifically, the distribution of public investments (publicly debated and 
available), representing the direct and public intervention of the government, shows 
expected values (based on each prefecture's population, economic activities etc.). On the 
other hand, recruitments (seen by politicians as their main instrument to assure votes and 
consensus) show considerable deviations favouring again Attiki. 
All these indicate that the political decision makers remain actually imprisoned to the 
notion of the Attiki-centric state. To this, if we add the confessed high rates of inter-
regional migration from the periphery towards the metropolitan areas of Athens, 
Thessaloniki and Patra, two major obstacles in any political or socio-economic effort 
aiming at decent decentralisation levels are revealed. Furthermore, if this philosophy of 
centralisation persists, there is no doubt that the Greek regional indicators in the following 
decades will exhibit no improvement in terms of harmonious cohesion, balanced 
development and acceptable infrastructure levels and thus decentralisation will still be a 
fading away target. 
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Given that Greece is a member of the European Union and the Union's new structural 
policies recognised in the Maastricht Treaty initialised a new phase, where the elimination 
of regional disparities and the strengthening of inner regional co-operation and cohesion 
within each Member State, are outlined as the main objective and an unquestionable 
prerequisite of every Government's political initiatives; it seems only logical to examine in 
the next few paragraphs the issues of decentralisation and regional disparities in a broader 
area and at an international level, that of the Mediterranean Countries of the European 
Union. This line of reasoning stems from the well established fact that within a community 
which is gradually moving towards explicit union, wide fluctuations are by no means 
acceptable, especially when they refer to regions that share common economic and 
structural characteristics. 
 
5. The Mediterranean Frontier 
 
The verification of the absence or the existence of homogeneity in terms of regional 
disparities and thus decentralisation, between the Mediterranean Members of the European 
Union will be presented through the analyses of regional disparities on a different scale and 
the utilisation of different political and socio-economic factors. More specifically, the aim is 
to detect the varying degrees of convergence or divergence, in an inter-regional perspective, 
within and between the Mediterranean countries of the European Union. 
Although the comparison of regional endowments raises immense methodological 
issues, we feel confident that the following five factors reflect and affect the 
decentralisation process within every Member State. These factors are: employment rate, 
number of hospital beds, number of dwellings, the services share and number of doctors. 
The analyses were relatively simple, but it was felt that the two calculated indices were 
particularly effective in describing the existing situation. More specifically, for every region 
in each Mediterranean country the standard deviation Sr of the percentages of each region 
to the country's total was calculated, as a straightforward measure of dispersion. In this 
framework, values of Sr near zero in effect represent a uniform distribution of all factors in 
a given region in accordance with the relevant importance of the region. On the other hand, 
values significantly different from zero, indicate political decision making processes that 
preserve and encourage regional differentials. As a second indicator, the standard error Sg 
of the Sr's of each column was calculated to reflect the regional homogeneity within each 
Mediterranean Member State and effectively represent a decentralisation index. Again, 
values of this index near zero reflect the existence of inter-regional uniformity, while larger 
values verify the absence of regional homogeneity. 
Table 2. Regional indicators in the Mediterranean Countries 
 
Region 
 
Sr 
 
Population
Emplo-
yment 
Hospital
Beds 
 
Dwellings
Services 
Share 
Doctors 
A.Makedonia - 
Thraki 
0,80 5,59 6,29 5,25 
 
5,25 3,97 4,60 
Kentriki 
Makedonia 
3,04 16,88 
 
16,74 
 
15,77 
 
15,77 
 
15,19 
 
8,78 
 
Dytiki Makedonia 0,27 2,86 2,71 2,51 2,51 2,13 2,83 
Thessalia 1,85 7,13 6,91 6,53 6,53 5,44 2,20 
Ipeiros 0,33 3,31 3,25 3,14 3,14 2,74 2,48 
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Ionia Nisia 
 
0,30 
 
1,86 
 
2,18 
 
2,16 
 
2,16 
 
1,68 
 
2,55 
 
Dytiki Ellada 1,36 6,83 7,01 6,08 6,08 5,51 3,26 
Sterea Ellada 0,99 5,63 4,94 5,25 5,25 3,76 3,12 
Peloponnisos 1,93 5,91 5,70 6,58 6,58 4,00 1,63 
Attiki 10,13 34,34 35,04 35,47 35,47 46,01 59,63 
Voreio Aigaio 0,52 1,94 1,69 2,94 2,94 2,32 2,12 
Notio Aigaio 0,72 2,50 2,18 2,99 2,99 3,29 4,25 
Kriti 1,15 5,22 5,35 5,33 5,33 3,95 2,55 
GREECE SSr = 2,63        
Galicia 0,93 7,20 8,19 6,37 6,37 5,64 5,97 
Asturias 0,13 2,89 2,84 2,89 2,89 2,60 2,99 
Cantabria 0,07 1,35 1,34 1,31 1,31 1,34 1,49 
Pais Vasco 0,40 5,46 5,51 4,91 4,91 5,37 5,97 
Navarra 0,12 1,34 1,43 1,21 1,21 1,23 1,49 
Rioja 0,07 0,67 0,72 0,73 0,73 0,56 0,75 
Aragon 0,28 3,11 3,30 3,44 3,44 2,92 3,73 
Madrid 1,98 12,52 12,96 11,91 11,91 15,71 16,42 
Castilla-Leon 0,55 6,74 6,72 7,53 7,53 6,22 7,46 
Castilla-La Mancha 0,74 4,40 4,13 4,89 4,89 3,67 2,99 
Extremadura 0,27 2,90 2,36 2,79 2,79 2,78 2,24 
Cataluna 1,04 15,42 17,53 16,93 16,93 14,76 16,42 
Comunidad 
Valenciam 
0,98 9,72 10,22 11,55 11,55 9,32 9,70 
Baleares 0,29 1,75 1,98 2,22 2,22 2,08 1,49 
Andalucia 1,42 17,76 14,43 15,57 15,57 18,05 15,67 
Murcia 0,14 2,64 2,62 2,51 2,51 2,47 2,24 
Ceuta y Melilla 0,16 0,32 0,25 0,24 0,24 0,50 0,00 
Canarias 0,77 3,81 3,48 3,01 3,01 4,95 2,99 
ESPANA Ss= 0,53        
|Norte 3,63 35,02 36,03 29,72 29,72 27,80 n/a 
Centre 2,98 17,50 17,75 20,03 20,03 12,74 n/a 
Lisboa e Vale do 
Tejo 
4,91 33,53 33,62 34,61 34,61 45,01 n/a 
Alentejo 1,11 5,53 4,82 7,28 7,28 5,65 n/a 
Algarve 0,55 3,43 3,08 4,13 4,13 4,39 n/a 
Azores 0,25 2,41 2,02 2,21 2,21 2,69 n/a 
Madeira 0,32 2,57 2,69 2,01 2,01 2,40 n/a 
PORTUGAL SSr= l,86        
Ile-de-France 2,30 18,84 21,64 18,65 n/a 21,92 24,11 
Champagne- 
Ardenne 
0,16 2,38 2,26 2,31 n/a 1,98 2,13 
Picardie 0,40 3,20 2,89 2,92 n/a 2,79 2,13 
Haute-Normandie 0,40 3,07 3,14 2,80 n/a 2,84 2,13 
Centre 0,30 4,19 3,96 4,26 n/a 3,76 3,55 
Basse-Normandie 0,20 2,46 2,61 2,56 n/a 2,27 2,13 
Bourgogne 0,37 2,84 2,52 3,11 n/a 2,62 2,13 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 0,51 6,99 6,09 6,19 n/a 6,62 5,67 
Lorraine 0,23 4,0 4,08 3,78 n/a 3,71 3,55 
Alsace 0,28 2,87 3,28 2,54 n/a 2,68 2,84 
Franche-Comte 0,22 1,94 1,80 1,90 n/a 1,62 1,42 
Pays de la Loire 0,52 5,40 5,59 5,20 n/a 4,96 4,26 
Bretagne 0,39 4,94 5,34 4,99 n/a 4,88 4,26 
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Poitu-Charentes 0,31 2,81 2,45 2,91 n/a 2,47 2,13 
Aquitaine 0,15 4,94 4,62 4,95 n/a 4,80 4,96 
Midi-Pyrenees 0,31 4,30 4,39 4,30 n/a 4,19 4,96 
Limousin 0,14 1,27 1,26 1,51 n/a 1,16 1,42 
Rhone- Alpes 0,22 9,46 9,52 9,46 n/a 8,99 9,22 
Auvergne 0,26 2,33 2,19 2,68 n/a 2,01 2,13 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 
0,43 3,75 3,21 4,19 n/a 4,05 4,26 
Provence- Alpes-
Cote 
1,15 7,53 6,92 8,22 n/a 8,73 9,93 
d'Azur 
Corse 
0,18 0,44 0,21 0,56 n/a 0,49 0,71 
Guadeloupe 0,00 0,0 0,00 0,00 n/a 0,00 0,00 
Martinique 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 n/a 0,00 0,00 
Guyane 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 n/a 0,00 0,00 
Reunion 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 n/a 0,00 0,00 
FRANCE SSr = 0,46        
Piemonte 1,22 7,62 9,82 9,22 9,22 6,60 7,95 
Valle d'Aosta 0,14 0,20 0,28 0,36 0,36 0,22 0,00 
Liguria 1,56 3,0 0,00 4,14 4,14 3,66 3,41 
Lombardia 2,26 15,60 20,67 15,58 15,58 14,13 15,91 
Trentino-Alto 
Adige 
0,30 1,55 2,06 1,65 1,65 1,69 1,14 
Veneto 1,21 7,6 9,91 7,11 7,11 6,64 6,82 
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia 
0,91 2,10 0,00 2,27 2,27 2,21 2,27 
Emilia-Romagna 1,01 6,86 9,32 7,39 7,39 6,51 6,82 
Toscana 0,70 6,23 7,79 6,34 6,34 6,39 5,68 
Umbria 0,18 1,44 1,70 1,35 1,35 1,38 1,14 
Marche 0,41 2,50 3,32 2,45 2,45 2,19 2,27 
Lazio 1,26 9,06 10,62 8,87 8,87 11,50 11,36 
Campania 1,32 9,41 9,71 7,35 7,35 10,02 10,23 
Abruzzi 0,15 2,22 2,62 2,28 2,28 2,22 2,27 
Molise 0,36 0,59 0,00 0,62 0,62 0,55 1,14 
Puglia 2,81 7,12 0,00 6,51 6,51 7,27 6,82 
Basilicata 0,04 1,09 1,06 1,05 1,05 1,02 1,14 
Calabria 1,52 3,76 0,00 3,76 3,76 3,85 3,41 
Sicilia 0,69 9,06 8,15 9,19 9,19 9,75 7,95 
Sardegna 0,30 2,90 2,97 2,51 2,51 2,99 2,27 
ITALIA SSr = 0,75        
 
 
The results of the analyses are shown in Table 2, while the values of the 
decentralisation index SSr are depicted in Figure 1. The results were expected with the 
possible exception of Spain. Specifically, a value for France equal to 0,46, the smallest 
among all the Mediterranean countries, can be explained by the well known fact that France 
compared to its Mediterranean neighbours tend to have high infrastructure and service 
provision levels, which become significantly higher and almost uniform when they are 
standardized for population. As for Spain, the relatively small value of 0,53 might be 
explained in terms of the rapidly expanding Spanish Market and the massive increases in 
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Foreign Direct Investment over the 1980's. The latter, brought major benefits to the 
country's national and regional economies and confirmed the fact that Spain is increasingly 
considered as a favourable candidate for further expenditure on regional incentives. On the 
other hand, for Greece and Portugal which represent, by far, the worst values of the index, 
the problem is indeed twofold: To strengthen the weak regions in terms of infrastructure 
and service provision levels, through the concentration of the available resources to the 
worst-affected areas and to increase the respective regional expenditures and the emphasis 
placed on the improvement on inter-regional differences. 
Figure 1. Decentralisation index in the Mediterranean 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Although the opponents of the decentralisation task range from\ the ever power-hungry 
central government politicians, the top civil servants and the local officials satisfied with a 
system that gives them influence and discharges them from the burden of exercising power, 
in Greece and in the other Mediterranean Member States, it is the overall political 
framework within which decision are made, that the traditional centralised systems were 
strengthened and intensified. 
In this respect, it was of no surprise that the overall status of both the Greek and the rest 
of the Mediterranean regions are reflected in the results shown earlier. And that despite the 
fact that the data analysed refer to the 1990's, well after the European Community 
demanded in 1982 a more decentralised administration and thus elimination of regional 
disparities. It seems therefore, that this is a process which has yet to ran its full course. On 
that basis, it is possible and plausible to claim, without being contradicted by past and 
present evidence, that decentralisation a policy option of all Mediterranean countries has yet 
to be seriously considered by the Southern European politicians. It remains, however, to be 
seen, whether the problem will be finally resolved through the verification of the old say 
"where people go, politics follow" and thus the solution will surprisingly emerge from an 
unavoidable change, whereby people and activities move away from the centre, a change 
that has already started in Greece, despite or rather in spite of what the politicians do or fail 
to do. 
G. Bianchi 
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